Mercer Law Review
Volume 55
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 3

12-2003

Administrative Law
Martin M. Wilson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Wilson, Martin M. (2003) "Administrative Law," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 55 : No. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol55/iss1/3

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Administrative Law
by Martin M. Wilson*

I.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Administrative law continues to be a front-burner item in the practice
of law because each day more and more activities, businesses, and
persons fall under a state or local agency's regulatory sphere of
influence. While the number of appellate cases reviewed in this Article
has dropped slightly from recent years, reports from several agency
heads in state and local governments would lead one to believe that
agency workloads only continue to increase. Given the current economy
and resulting shortfalls of tax revenues, it will be interesting to observe
what effects static or reduced levels of enforcement and regulatory
officials will have on the number of agency cases and resulting appellate
filings.
This Article is a review of administrative law cases from the Georgia
Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2002
through May 31, 2003. It is not an attempt to review all reported cases
under the amorphous grouping of administrative law. Most topics
reflecting the subject matter of other survey articles in this issue have
been omitted. Because of the commonality of the interpretations of
governing statutes and procedures between administrative agencies and
local government entities, authorities, and agencies, some local
government cases reported in this Article may also be reported in the
local government law article. The cases in this Article focus on
processes, procedures, and prelitigation activities and should be
distinguished from comparative reviews.
The first substantive portion of this Article examines cases that
highlight the defenses and immunities raised by agencies when
controversies occur. A trio of cases involving the Georgia Tort Claims
* Partner in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1975; J.D., with honors, 1978). Member, State Bar of Georgia. The author wishes
to thank Jennifer Blackburn for her assistance in compiling this Article.
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Act ("GTCA")' are reported, along with one case involving the Georgia
Open Meetings Act.2 The next segment of the Article contains cases in
which the appellate courts have discussed the standards of review used
to determine whether an agency decision should stand. The validity of
underlying rules is the topic of cases reviewed in the subsequent
segment, and a discussion of recent legislation from the Georgia General
Assembly completes the Article.
II.

AGENCY DEFENSES AND IMMUNITIES

About the best defense an agency can have to a claim of liability
asserted against it is the successful assertion of sovereign immunity
under the Georgia Constitution.3
The Georgia Tort Claims Act
("GTCA") 4 provides only limited exceptions to sovereign immunity, and
these exceptions have been conservatively, but fairly, interpreted.
Agency personnel for the Georgia Department of Transportation ("DOT"),
who assigned speed limits to state roadways, were given such immunity
in Department of Transportationv. Watts. 5
Simply described, the complaint in Watts came from the mother of a
child who was struck and killed on a state highway by an automobile
traveling at a speed within the posted fifty miles per hour speed limit.
The complaint alleged that the DOT personnel were negligent and
should have previously lowered the posted speed limit to thirty-five
miles per hour because of residential congestion and the presence of
pedestrians. The DOT claimed sovereign immunity as its defense and
moved to dismiss.6 At trial the DOT cited the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 50-21-24(5), which provides: "The state
shall have no liability for losses resulting from ... [a]dministrative
action or inaction of a legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasijudicial nature."7
The court of appeals had no problem reversing the trial court's denial
of the DOT's motion to dismiss.8 The court began its analysis by citing
a Georgia Supreme Court case holding that an agency performs a quasilegislative function when it promulgates rules-a power statutorily

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 to -37 (2002).
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (2002).
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9.
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 to -37 (2002).
260 Ga. App. 905, 581 S.E.2d 410 (2003).
Id. at 905, 581 S.E.2d at 411.
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(5) (2000); 260 Ga. App. at 905-06, 581 S.E.2d at 411.
260 Ga. App. at 907, 581 S.E.2d at 413.
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authorized by the general assembly.9 In this case, state law gave the
commissioners of transportation and public safety the authority to
establish or alter certain speed limits, so those agencies exercised a
quasi-legislative function when they established the speed limits on state
highways. ° The court equated the administrative action of establishing a speed limit as a process similar to the legislative act of enacting
laws. 1 Because the DOT's action was quasi-legislative, the DOT could
not be held liable for the adverse
consequences of such action, regardless
12
of whether it was negligent.
The ante litem notice provision of the GTCA 3 seems to trip up at
least one litigant in the appellate courts during every survey period. For
this Article, the unlucky litigant was Jessica Dempsey. Ms. Dempsey
was a University of Georgia student who was injured when a tree limb
fell on her. Apparently, a grounds maintenance employee was trimming
trees on the campus, and Ms. Dempsey had the misfortune of getting in
the way. A university official sent a first class letter to the Department
of Administrative Services Risk Management Division to relate the
circumstances surrounding Ms. Dempsey's injuries and the possible need
for further treatment. 4 The university official purportedly told Ms.
Dempsey the letter was being sent "so that her claim would comply with
the notice requirements of the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA)."' 5
After communicating with insurance adjusters for the state, Ms.
Dempsey filed suit against the Board of Regents of the University
System of Georgia. The trial court granted the
Board's motion to
6
dismiss premised on improper ante litem notice.'
On appeal Dempsey argued three propositions:
(1) substantial
compliance, (2) reliance on the actions of a university official, and (3)
actual notice of the claim.' 7 The court of appeals decided against the
first argument, citing a string of appellate court cases mandating a strict
interpretation of the notice requirement and requiring that strict
compliance be demonstrated." With respect to the second argument,

9. Id. at 906, 581 S.E.2d at 412 (citing Long v. State, 202 Ga. 235, 42 S.E.2d 729
(1947)).
10. Id. at 906-07, 581 S.E.2d at 412; see O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-181 to -182 (2001).
11. 260 Ga. App. at 907, 581 S.E.2d at 412.
12. Id., 581 S.E.2d at 413.
13. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26 (2002).
14. Dempsey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 256 Ga. App. 291, 291, 568
S.E.2d 154, 154-55 (2002).
15. Id., 568 S.E.2d at 155.
16. Id. at 291-92, 568 S.E.2d at 155.
17. Id. at 292-94, 568 S.E.2d at 155-56.
18. Id. at 293, 568 S.E.2d at 156.
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the court refused to allow waiver to be asserted against the agency
employee, even though plaintiff relied on the university official to give
proper notice.19 Finally, the court deemed the actual notice argument
irrelevant.2 0
Accordingly, because subject matter jurisdiction was
dependent upon giving proper ante litem notice, the trial court's
dismissal was affirmed. 2'
The last GTCA case during the survey period was Department of
Transportation v. Montgomery Tank Lines, Inc.22 This was an admittedly novel case before the supreme court. Certiorari was granted to
settle whether the GTCA allows the state to be held liable for contribution or indemnity claims based upon an agency's or employee's status as
a joint tortfeasor.2 '
In the cases combined on appeal, defendant
tortfeasors in the original pleadings settled wrongful death actions and
subsequently sought contribution or indemnity from the DOT based upon
negligent design and maintenance of an intersection.2 4
The DOT defended the actions by urging a narrow interpretation of
the term "loss," as defined in the GTCA.2" Under the DOT's view,
contribution or indemnity could not be a recoverable loss because the
statutory definition is limited to first-party losses.2 ' Because contribution and indemnity payments are not included in the statute's definition,
and because the enlargement clause of the list provided in that
definition pertains only to other first-party losses, no recognized loss
could be proven or awarded in these cases.27
The court of appeals rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the
DOT could be held liable for contribution or indemnity if it could have
been named under the GTCA as a defendant tortfeasor in the original
action. 28 The supreme court arrived at the same conclusion, citing a
consistent holding from the United States Supreme Court.2 9 According
to the court, if the DOT could have been sued in an original action under

19. Id. at 294, 568 S.E.2d at 157.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 276 Ga. 105, 575 S.E.2d 487 (2003).
23. Id. at 105, 575 S.E.2d at 488.
24. See Dep't of Transp. v. Montgomery Tank Lines, Inc., 253 Ga. App. 143, 143, 558
S.E.2d 723, 723 (2002); and Dep't of Transp. v. Fed. Express Corp., 254 Ga. App. 149, 149,
561 S.E.2d 470, 470 (2002).
25. 276 Ga. at 106-07, 575 S.E.2d at 489; see generally O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22(3) (2002).
26. 276 Ga. at 106-07, 575 SE.2d at 489; see O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22(3) (2002).
27. 276 Ga. at 107, 575 S.E.2d at 489.
28. 253 Ga. App. at 145, 558 S.E.2d at 725.
29. 276 Ga. at 108, 575 S.E.2d at 490 (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S.
543 (1951)).
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one of the causes of action listed as exceptions under O.C.G.A. section
50-21-24, then bringing a subsequent claim for contribution or indemnity
is not barred by sovereign immunity.3"
As illustrated above, sometimes the defenses and immunities asserted
by agencies are not successful. The Evans County Board of Commissioners had such an experience when it was sued by the local newspaper for
a violation of the Open Meetings Act. 1 After the trial court found a
violation of the Act, the court of appeals entertained questions concerning the violation and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to consider whether to award attorney fees.32 The trial court held
a hearing, and it was stipulated that the local newspaper had attorney
fees totaling $21,320.63. Of this total, $9,699.88 was for the lower court
litigation. The trial court awarded the newspaper attorney fees for both
the trial work and the first appellate case, despite the board of
commissioners' argument that only the trial court litigation should be
subject to the award. In compliance with the appellate court's instructions, the trial court found that the violation of the Open Meetings Act
by the board of commissioners lacked substantial justification. In
response the board of commissioners reminded the trial court of its prior
finding that there had been no bad faith exhibited by the board of
commissioners in its actions, and argued that this must preclude the
trial court's finding that the board's actions were without substantial
justification. 3
The court of appeals had explained the difference between acting
without substantial justification and exhibiting bad faith in the prior
appeal. 4 The question of first impression in the second appeal was
whether a trial court could award attorney fees for the appellate work
occasioned by the appeal of the original judgment by the board of
commissioners.3" Ruling in accordance with what the appellate court
felt was a consensus of opinion under open government laws from other
states, the pronouncement was as follows: "We hold that the Act permits
recovery of costs and attorney fees for litigation in appellate courts when
such costs and fees otherwise would be compensable under [O.C.G.A.
section] 50-14-5(b)."36
30. Id. at 110, 575 S.E.2d at 492.
31. Evans County Bd.of Comm'rs. v. Claxton Enter., 255 Ga. App. 656, 566 S.E.2d 399
(2002); O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (2002).
32. Claxton Enter. v. Evans County Bd.of Comm'rs, 249 Ga. App. 870,870, 549 S.E.2d
830, 830 (2001).
33. 255 Ga. App. at 657-58, 566 S.E.2d at 401.
34. 249 Ga. App. at 877-78, 549 S.E.2d at 836-37.
35. 255 Ga. App. at 659, 566 S.E.2d at 402.
36. Id.
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Three reasons were asserted for staying with the consensus. 7 First,
the pertinent statute itself did not mention the term "trial court"; rather,
the term "proceeding" was used and could apply to a variety of judicial
forums. 3 Second, citing prior cases, the court concluded that allowing
appellate costs and fees was a good public policy decision and could
provide the resources from which private actions to enforce the Open
Meetings Act could be followed to the conclusion of litigation.3 9 Third,
the court of appeals noted that the Open Meetings Act does not allow
appellate courts to award attorney fees; the Act only allows superior
courts to award costs and attorney fees.40 If an individual was not
permitted to recover costs and attorney fees for litigation in appellate
courts, the resulting inequity could eventually frustrate attempts at
private enforcement of the Open Meetings Act.4
III.

A.

STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS

The "Any Evidence" Rule

The "any evidence" rule is derived from interpretations of O.C.G.A.
section 50-13-19(h).4 2 During the survey period, two good cases were
handed down concerning the "any evidence" rule.43 In Professional
Standards Commission v. Smith," Smith was an elementary school
teacher accused of providing his students with answers to standardized
tests. An administrative law judge conducted a hearing on whether
Smith should be disciplined based on the accusations. One teacher's
testimony was hearsay of what students had told her. Another teacher
testified that he had gone to Smith's classroom and found copies of the
standardized tests, complete with the students' names and practice
grades. The administrative law judge only admitted the copies as
evidence to show that the copies were found in Smith's classroom and
had been used. The administrative law judge suspended Smith's
teaching certificate for six months.
The Professional Standards
Commission affirmed the decision, and Smith appealed to superior court.
The superior court reversed, holding that the hearsay testimony and the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 659-60, 566 S.E.2d at 402-03.
Id. at 659, 660, 566 S.E.2d at 402, 403.
Id. at 659, 566 S.E.2d at 402.
Id. at 659-60, 566 S.E.2d at 402-03; see O.C.G.A. § 50-14-5 (1998).
255 Ga. App. at 659, 566 S.E.2d at 402.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h) (2002).
See Prof1 Standards Comm'n v. Smith, 257 Ga. App. 418, 571 S.E.2d 443 (2002);

Infinite Energy, Inc. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 257 Ga. App. 757, 572 S.E.2d 91 (2002).
44. 257 Ga. App 418, 571 S.E.2d 443 (2002).
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documentary evidence were inadmissible. The case was remanded for
a new hearing, but the Professional Standards Commission appealed.45
Specifically citing the any evidence rule,46 the court of appeals
examined the administrative law judge's reasons for ruling that the
documentary evidence was admissible.4 7 In the court's view, there was
sufficient evidence to support the administrative law judge's decision
even after treating portions of the submissions as inadmissible or
admissible only for limited purposes, as the administrative law judge
had done. 48 Smith admitted that the materials were found in his
classroom and that he used standardized test materials as "diagnostic
tests."49 The court also noted that, under undisputed testimony, all
standardized tests constituted materials that teachers were only allowed
to have when the students were taking the test.50
Taking the available admissible evidence as a whole and applying the
any evidence rule, the court reversed the superior court, holding that the
administrative law judge received sufficient evidence to find that Smith
had committed the alleged violations.5 1
Relying on Handcrafted
Furniture v. Black ,52 the court opined, "As factfinder, [the administrative law judge] had the exclusive prerogative of weighing evidence and
determining the credibility of witnesses." 3
The second case applying the any evidence rule concerned the "trueup" procedures commonly used by gas marketers.5 4 Many gas marketers used the Atlanta Gas Light distribution system, and under pertinent
provisions, they had to estimate and supply Atlanta Gas Light with
appropriate amounts of natural gas to deliver to the marketers'
customers. Because these estimates were not exact predictions, the
marketers had to true-up periodically according to actual usage. The
Public Service Commission issued an initial true-up process order on
September 18, 1998, which charged Atlanta Gas Light with putting

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
at 117,
54.
(2002).

Id. at 418-20, 571 S.E.2d at 443-45.
Id. at 418, 420, 571 S.E.2d at 444, 446.
Id. at 420, 571 S.E.2d at 445.
Id.
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 446.
Id.
Id.
182 Ga. App. 115, 354 S.E.2d 696 (1987).
257 Ga. App. at 420, 571 S.E.2d at 446 (citing HandcraftedFurniture,182 Ga. App.
354 S.E.2d at 699).
Infinite Energy, Inc. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 257 Ga. App. 757, 572 S.E.2d 91
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together true-up calculations for the marketers, but charged the
marketers themselves with settling debits and credits for gas usage. 5
On April 5, 2000, the Public Service Commission approved an actual
true-up settlement methodology proposed by several of the marketers
and Atlanta Gas Light. This method was to be applied retroactively and
affected all transactions dating back to November 1998, when gas
marketers started servicing gas customers. Upon the denial of a motion
for reconsideration brought by Infinite Energy, a petition for review was
filed in superior court. Infinite Energy argued that the commission's
order should not relate back to November 1, 1998, but the superior court
disagreed and affirmed the decision of the Public Service Commission. 6
On appeal Infinite Energy asserted that the superior court used a
"clearly erroneous" standard when evaluating the legal reasoning. This
argument was based on the fact that the superior court judge's order did
not state that the Public Service Commission's conclusions of law were
subject to de novo review.57 The appellate court noted that while courts
review findings of fact only to determine whether there was evidence8
supporting the finding, all conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.1
However, the appellate court refused to hold that the lower court used
an erroneous standard of review simply because the order did not recite
a standard. 9 To support its holding, the court reasoned that the order
itself showed no improper review, and Infinite Energy did not reveal any
such issue.6"
Additionally, the appellate court addressed Infinite Energy's argument
that the issue of whether the gas marketers were on notice that they
were required to resolve the gas volume differentials was a question of
law, which the court should have reviewed de novo. 6' The court
rejected this argument and labeled the notice issue as a question of
62
fact.
The court of appeals summarily rejected Infinite Energy's other two
arguments.65 Infinite Energy asserted that the superior court should
have found that the Public Service Commission acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner when it overturned its own September 18, 1998

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 757, 572 S.E.2d at 91-93.
Id. at 758, 572 S.E.2d at 93.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 759, 572 S.E.2d at 93.
Id.
Id., 572 S.E.2d at 94.
Id.
Id. at 759-60, 572 S.E.2d at 94.
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true-up order and substituted it with the April 5, 2000 order.64 The
court disagreed and categorized the later order as a mere amendment,
which contained the means to implement its prior order that a true-up
should take place.6" In other words, the Public Service Commission
had already ordered that the gas marketers were responsible for the
true-up of gas volume differentials, and in its later order, it provided the
methodology for doing so.66
The final argument presented was a little far fetched. The superior
court judge's statements at the hearing were allegedly contrary to the
order subsequently entered. 67 How this was relevant as an enumeration of error is unexplained in the case, but it certainly was not accepted
by the court of appeals.6"
B.

Plain Meaning of Statutes

Cox v. Barber6 9 concerned whether the plain meaning of a residency
requirement could be applied in a constitutional manner despite an
implicit latent ambiguity in the statute. In 1998 the general assembly
established that members of the Public Service Commission, although
elected statewide, must reside within geographic districts as provided in
relevant statutes. 7° In part, the new requirement provided that to be
eligible for election, a candidate on the ballot "must have resided in that
district for at least 12 months prior to election thereto." 1
Mac Barber had been a resident of Jackson County, what was then
district four, until becoming a legal resident of Banks County on
January 15, 2002. At its 2002 regular session, the general assembly
changed the district lines for the district four Public Service Commission
seat, no7longer
including Jackson County. However, it did include Banks
2
County.
Upon Barber's attempt to qualify for the district four seat, his
opponent entered an eligibility challenge. The administrative law judge
ruled that the residency requirement had not been met, and the
Secretary of State adopted the initial decision of the administrative law

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 759, 572 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 759-60, 572 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 760, 572 S.E.2d at 94.
Id.
Id.
275 Ga. 415, 568 S.E.2d 478 (2002).
O.C.G.A. § 46-2-1 (Supp. 2003).
Id.
275 Ga. at 416-17, 568 S.E.2d at 479-80. The statutory change to O.C.G.A. § 46-2-1

is found at 2002 Ga. Laws 359, §§ 1, 2.
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judge as the final agency decision as provided under O.C.G.A. section 5013-17. 78
On appeal to the superior court, Barber prevailed. He was a resident
of Jackson County in November 2001, one year before the election date.
Because Jackson County was in district four one year before the election
date, it would be unconstitutional to interpret the 2002 legislation in a
manner to disqualify Barber as not residing within the district for one
year prior to the election.7 4
The question for the supreme court was how to interpret the statute. 75 Must candidates have lived within the district four territory, as
defined in the 2002 enactment of the general assembly, for one year
before the November election in 2002, or was it sufficient that the
candidate resided in the district four territory as it had been defined one
year prior to the election date? Barber, of course, urged that the
superior court made the correct choice. Logic dictated that the choice
must have been correct, because the district lines had not even been in
existence for twelve months prior to the general election date."
The supreme court held otherwise. 7'
Barber's equal protection
argument was analyzed under the rational relationship test.75 The
court determined that an interpretation requiring twelve months'
residence in the territory of the district as it exists on the date of the
election was "rationally related to the state's legitimate interests in
fostering informed voters and promoting79knowledgeable and responsive
candidates with ties to the community."
Whether this decision was correct or not, the interpretation was
consistent with that of the residency requirement for state legislators
under the constitution."0 One must only look at the reapportionment
process for state legislators after a decennial census to find many
examples of the application of this interpretation. Sometimes two or
more incumbents in the same house of the general assembly find
themselves in the same district. They must either enter a tough reelection race against a fellow incumbent or quickly change their
residences.

73. 275 Ga. at 416, 568 S.E.2d at 479-80; O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17 (2002).
74. 275 Ga. at 416, 568 S.E.2d at 479-80.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 419, 568 S.E.2d at 482.
78. Id. at 418, 568 S.E.2d at 481.
79. Id. at 419, 568 S.E.2d at 482.
80. GA. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 3.
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C. Agency Deference
This Article reviews only one case illustrating the principle that an
agency's statutory interpretation is entitled to deference in a court
review. However, in this case, the agency was wrong. In Department of
Community Health v. Freels,8 the parents of a five-year-old child with
cerebral palsy sought reimbursement from the Department of Community Health's Medicaid program for hyperbaric oxygen therapy. The
attending physician requested payment for the therapy, and the
department's physician panel conducted a review and denied the
requested sums. The parents then requested an administrative
hearing.8 2
The patient's father and an expert in hyperbaric medicine testified at
the hearing. The expert testified that the therapy effectively delivered
oxygen to the adversely affected area of the child's brain. He also
showed that certain scans revealed increased blood flow, which may have
restored more normal bodily functions. The results of the scans were
accompanied by improvement in the patient's speech. The department
called two experts, and both refuted any biological reasons why the
therapy would be beneficial. Citing the department's witnesses, the
the parents for the costs of the
department decided not to8 reimburse
3
hyperbaric oxygen therapy.

On appeal the superior court reversed the agency's decision. The
judge determined that the department's legal analysis of the applicable
governing provisions was incorrect, and the department's focus on the
medical necessity of the treatments was the wrong standard.8 4
The Department of Community Health took the matter to the court of
appeals. The department argued that the standards used to evaluate
whether the costs of the therapy would be reimbursed were permissible
under the governing federal provisions of the Medicaid program.
Additionally, the department argued that state rules were a permissible
implementation of the Medicaid program in a consistent manner.8 5
The court of appeals strongly disagreed with the department's
assertion.8 While noting that agency interpretations are entitled to
deference, the court stated that the department followed its own

81. 258 Ga. App. 446, 576 S.E.2d 2 (2002).
82. Id. at 446-47, 576 S.E.2d at 3-4.
83. Id. at 446-48, 576 S.E.2d at 3-5.
84. Id. at 448, 576 S.E.2d at 5.
85. Id. at 450, 576 S.E.2d at 6.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 449, 576 S.E.2d at 5.
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rules, not the governing federal statute, when it decided not to reimburse.8 8 Instead of deciding whether the chosen hyperbaric oxygen
therapy "'was necessary to correct or ameliorate [the child's] physical
condition,"'' 9 the department based its denial on medical necessity and
standards of practice.9" Medical necessity was not a requirement under
the governing federal statute, so the department was incorrect. 91
The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
because the superior court failed to apply the any evidence rule
regarding the determinations of fact.9
The department, not the
reviewing court, should have decided whether the expert witnesses were
qualified and which ones, if any, should be relied upon.93
IV.

VALIDITY OF RULES

The largest number of cases addressed in this Article concerned
various attacks on the rules of agencies and governmental subdivisions.
The first case was Albany Surgical, P.C. v. Department of Community
Health.94 One of the Department of Community Health's duties was to
enforce the Certificate of Need Act9 5 to prevent unbridled capital
expenditures on health care facilities and services. Albany Surgical
sought a declaratory judgment in superior court regarding department
rules, which provided that an ambulatory surgical center used for
general surgery was not within the Certificate of Need program's
exemption for single specialties.96 Albany Surgical appealed the grant
of summary judgment in favor of the department.97
Reviewing the lower court's decision, the court of appeals considered
two issues: first, whether the regulations were authorized by the
legislature, and second, whether the regulations were reasonable.9 8
Deciding both questions affirmatively, the court of appeals affirmed the
lower court's holding.9 9 With respect to the first question, the court

88. Id. at 450, 576 S.E.2d at 6.
89. Id. (quoting Freels v. Comm'r, No. 01-CV-2932-10, 2001 WL 1809412, at *4 (Ga.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 2001)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 450-51, 576 S.E.2d at 6.
92. Id. at 452, 576 S.E.2d at 7.
93. Id.
94. 257 Ga. App. 636, 572 S.E.2d 638 (2002).
95. O.C.G.A. § 31-6-40 (2002).
96. 257 Ga. App. at 636-37, 572 S.E.2d at 640. The rules in question were Ga. Comp.
R. & Regs. R. 272-2-.01(19)(h)3, 272-2-.09(1)(b)10 (2002).
97. 257 Ga. App. at 636, 572 S.E.2d at 640.
98. Id. at 637, 572 S.E.2d at 641.
99. Id. at 636, 572 S.E.2d at 640.
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determined that O.C.G.A. section 33-6-21(b)(4) 1' ° expressly granted
authority for the department to make rules implementing the Certificate
of Need Act. 10' When the general assembly enacted the single specialty surgical center exemption from Certificate of Need requirements in
1991, there was already a promulgated regulation excluding general
surgery from a predecessor exemption called the "limited purpose
ambulatory surgical program.""°2 The appellate court reasoned that
the department's actions must have followed the legislature's intent for
two reasons: (1) the legislature was presumed to be aware of those
provisions existing at the time of the subsequent promulgation at issue,
and (2) in 1998 the general assembly did not object to the regulation
requiring3 a Certificate of Need for a multispecialty general surgery
0
center.
The second question before the court, determining whether the
regulation was reasonable, required a much simpler analysis. The
Certificate of Need was meant to limit unnecessary duplication of health
care facilities and services within close geographical proximity."° The
regulation subjecting ambulatory surgical centers practicing general
surgery to the Certificate of Need Act requirements followed that intent
and was not unreasonable.'0 5
United American Insurance Co. v. Insurance Department of Geor0 6
gia'
concerned the rejection of Medicare supplement insurance rates
as filed by the insurer under O.C.G.A. section 33-43-4.107 Under the
applicable statutes and regulations, which had been promulgated to
implement the regulatory framework for such policies, United American
was obligated to make its rate filing using proper actuarial principles.
Because the premiums received by such insurers would be invested for
a short time, actuarial standards recognized that income would be
generated from these investments and required the filing to include an
interest assumption. United American did not use an interest assumption in its rate filing. 08

100. O.C.G.A. § 33-6-21(b)(4) (2000).
101. 257 Ga. App. at 637-38, 572 S.E.2d at 641.
102. Id. at 639, 572 S.E.2d at 642. The enactment was an amendment to O.C.G.A.
section 31-6-2(14)(G)(iii) by 1991 Ga. Laws 1871. The former regulation was Ga. Comp. R.
& Regs. R. 272-2-.09 (2002).
103. 257 Ga. App. at 639, 572 S.E.2d at 642.
104. Id. at 640, 572 S.E.2d at 643.
105. Id.
106. 258 Ga. App. 735, 574 S.E.2d 830 (2002).
107. Id. at 735, 574 S.E.2d at 830; O.C.G.A. § 33-43-4 (2002).
108. 258 Ga. App. at 736-37, 574 S.E.2d at 831-32.
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Out of the approximately 150 filings for Medicare supplement
premium changes pending, United American and one of its affiliates
were the only filings without interest assumptions. The department
rejected United American's rate filing because it did not comply with
applicable provisions of law and regulations, and the insurer failed to
provide requested additional information. The superior court affirmed
the ruling. °9
On appeal United American questioned the rejection of its filing and
the terms of the Commissioner's order, which required the insurer to go
back to the inception of its Medicare supplement business and recalculate its loss ratios to account for the interest assumption that should
have been made. United American argued that the department had
approved every rate filing it had submitted prior to the rejected one and,
accordingly, this gave the insurer the right to rely upon that approval.
Thus, by ignoring past approvals, the Commissioner instituted a
retroactive application of a rule."
The court of appeals was not convinced."' The court termed the2
Public Service Commission's rate process as a legislative function;"
in contrast, by determining "whether the proposed rates [were]
calculated in accordance with the statutory formula, the Insurance
Department was exercising an administrative function."'
There was
no vested right to rely on the prior approved rates as a type of safe
harbor."4 The court concluded that there was no retroactivity present
in the ruling. 115 The statutes and regulations required an annual
analysis, which United American had not been performing correctly;
thus, the ruling only required United American to begin using the
correct formula." 6
The next case regarding the validity of agency rules was City of
Buford v. Georgia Power Co."' Georgia Power began building a
substation on its property in Buford. The city sought to enforce an
ordinance that declared a one-year moratorium on the construction of
substations within 500 feet of residential property. When the city issued
a stop work order to Georgia Power, Georgia Power sued the city seeking

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 737, 574 S.E.2d at 832.
Id. at 738, 574 S.E.2d at 833.
Id.
Id. at 739, 574 S.E.2d at 833.
Id.
Id., 574 S.E.2d at 834.
Id. at 739-40, 574 S.E.2d at 833-34.
Id. at 739, 574 S.E.2d at 834.
276 Ga. 590, 581 S.E.2d 16 (2003).

20031

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional and an
injunction to keep the city from attempting to enforce that order.11
The trial court held that the ordinance was preempted by general
state statutes. The city appealed to the supreme court. 9 In a twopage opinion, the court affirmed the judgment of the superior court. 20
Beginning with the state constitution provision declaring that general
21
laws preempt local or special laws,'
the court cited two reasons why
1 22
stand.
not
could
the ordinance
First, O.C.G.A. section 36-5-6(a)(5) 12 prohibits ordinances that
interfere with the regulatory powers of the Public Service Commission
for regulated business activities outside of an express power given to a
city. 24 The Buford charter did not confer sufficient power upon the
city to sustain the ordinance because the charter was directed only at
restrictions on the use of city property.12 Georgia Power was building
126
on private property; therefore, the charter provision did not apply.
Second, the Public Service Commission was given virtually complete
power to regulate electric light and power companies.1 27
Citing
numerous statutory provisions outlining this power, the court declared
that legislative intent allowed the Public Service Commission
to exercise
28
its authority to the exclusion of the city's asserted power.
A novel argument asserting the unconstitutionality of a county
2
ordinance was presented in Board of Public Education v. Hair. 1
Pursuant to an ordinance passed by Chatham County under O.C.G.A.
section 48-5-404,130 the county tax commissioner collected the school
taxes for the school boards, and the county was paid a commission of 2.5
percent. This 2002 ordinance providing for the 2.5 percent commission
replaced the 1.51 percent commission in 2001. The school board
protested and pointed out that because of the increase in the county's
commission, the school board was paying roughly 11 percent more than
it cost the county to collect the funds. When the superior court ruled in

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 590, 581 S.E.2d at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 4(a)).
Id. at 590-91, 581 S.E.2d at 17.
O.C.G.A. § 36-5-6(a)(5) (2000).
276 Ga. at 590, 581 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 590-91, 581 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 591, 581 S.E.2d at 17.
Id., 581 S.E.2d at 18.
Id. The delegated power was quoted from O.C.G.A. section 46-2-20 (1992).
276 Ga. 575, 581 S.E.2d 28 (2003).
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-404 (1999).
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favor of the county, the school board appealed to the supreme court and
offered two arguments. First, the school board argued that O.C.G.A.
section 48-5-404 conflicted with the applicable constitutional provisions.
The board contended that the constitution provided that the local boards
of education would reimburse the county for collection of school taxes,
and the statute provided that the tax commissioner was entitled to a
commission of a flat 2.5 percent. 3 1 The board claimed that the statute
was unconstitutional because it allowed the county to receive more
money2 than the reimbursement amount permitted by the constitu13
tion.

The supreme court refused to accept this argument.'3 3 The constitution provided that the general assembly could set a statewide rate for
34
such services by counties, and the general assembly had done so.
The court recognized that it was possible that some school boards would
underpay the collecting governmental entity, while others might
overpay.'
However, the court could find nothing in the record to
support the argument that 2.5 percent was an unreasonable rate for
reimbursement. 136
Second, the board argued that the overpayment of costs violated the
constitutional provision that school taxes can only be spent for educational purposes. 3 7 This argument was even weaker. Georgia law does
not allow the board to collect school taxes, and constitutional provisions
provide that the governmental entity collecting the taxes would be paid
a statewide reimbursement rate.3 8 Thus, the court reasoned that the
amounts paid to the collecting entity are "a necessary and incidental
public education expense, authorized under the Georgia Constitution." 139

How do you attack agency actions if there is no rule upon which to
question their validity?

In Georgia Oilmen's Ass'n v. Department of

Revenue, 4 ' the court of appeals offered potential plaintiffs a road
map."' The Oilmen and the Georgia Association of Convenience
Stores brought a declaratory judgment action based on disagreements

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

276 Ga. at 575-76, 581 S.E.2d at 30; see GA. CONST. art. V111, § 6, para. 3.
276 Ga. at 575-76, 581 S.E.2d at 30.
Id. at 576, 581 S.E.2d at 30-31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 577, 581 S.E.2d at 31; see GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6, para. 1(b).
276 Ga. at 577, 581 S.E.2d at 31.
Id.
261 Ga. App. 393, 582 S.E.2d 549 (2003).
Id. at 394-401, 582 S.E.2d at 549-55.
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with the Department of Revenue ("DOR") over several malt beverage
distribution regulations. The trial court ruled in favor of the DOR on all
of the questioned regulations, but granted summary judgment for the
Oilmen based on an interpretive DOR rule on split deliveries. Both
sides appealed, and the cases were consolidated for review.'4 2
The malt beverage distribution regulations were upheld by the court
of appeals as reasonable and not in conflict with the constitution or
The interesting part of the case is the Department
general statutes.'
of Revenue's appeal. The department argued that the superior court
mistakenly granted summary judgment to the Oilmen based on the
The prohibited conduct was for a
prohibition of split deliveries.
wholesaler to receive a single malt beverage order, but then for the
wholesaler to deliver the order in parts to more than one retailer."
The trial court "declared1 45this 'rule' invalid because it was not published
and was unreasonable."
The court of appeals reversed, determining that the prohibition was
146
not a rule but merely an interpretation of other statutes and rules.
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 50-13-11,141 the way to attack an agency's
148
interpretive rule is to request a declaratory ruling from the agency.
The DOR's rules specifically provided that an entity could seek a
declaratory ruling on the applicability of a rule. 149 If the Oilmen did
not get relief under the agency's declaratory ruling, the Oilmen could
then file an appeal to superior court. 50
Because a decision on the split deliveries prohibition was not pursued
through the appropriate administrative procedures applicable to
questions of interpretation by the agency, no original declaratory
judgment action brought in superior court would lie against the
DOR. 15' Sovereign immunity, which is waived for challenges of rules
appropriately brought under O.C.G.A. section 50-13-10, l 5 2 remained

142. Id. at 393-94, 582 S.E.2d at 550.
143. Id. at 395-99, 582 S.E.2d at 551-55.
144. Id. at 399, 582 S.E.2d at 555.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 400-01, 582 S.E.2d at 555.
147. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-11 (2002).
148. 261 Ga. App. at 399, 582 S.E.2d at 554.
149. Id. at 400, 582 S.E.2d at 554. The agency rule is Ga. Comp. R. & Reg. R. 560-1-1.10 (2001).
150. 261 Ga. App. at 400, 582 S.E.2d at 554.
151. Id. at 401, 582 S.E.2d at 555.
152. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10 (2002).
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intact, and the motion to dismiss filed by the DOR should have been
granted." 3
V.

DIRECT APPEAL OR APPLICATION TO APPEAL

Appellate case reports are full of instances in which litigants have
chosen the wrong procedure to obtain appellate review of cases.
Ferguson v. Composite State Board of Medical Examiners.15 adds one
more to the list. Ferguson requested that the Board of Medical
Examiners reinstate his license to practice medicine, and the board
denied his petition. Instead of appealing the denial to superior court,
Ferguson filed for a writ of mandamus. Upon a ruling in favor of the
board, Ferguson filed a direct appeal and an application for discretionary
appeal. 5 ' The supreme court reviewed the application for discretionary appeal and denied it on the merits.'56 The court took the opportunity presented by the direct appeal to remind the legal community of the
precedent set in Rebich v. Miles.'57
Ferguson questioned a ruling by the board, and although he brought
an original petition for mandamus, he instead could have appealed the
ruling.15 Under O.C.G.A. section 5-6-35,"59 the review of a superior
court decision regarding agency actions should always be pursued by an
application for discretionary appeal. 6 ° The supreme court fashioned
its warning to lawyers as follows:
Accordingly, we again caution litigants that before proceeding to this
Court, a party should always 'review the discretionary application
statute to see if it covers the underlying subject matter of the appeal.
If it does, then the party MUST file an application for appeal as
provided under [O.C.G.A. section] 5-6-35. '161

In Ferguson the court re-examined the direct appeal in Sprayberry v.
Dougherty County 62 and distinguished it from the Ferguson facts." 3
In Sprayberry the owners filed for a mandamus to seek relief from the
issuance of a zoning variance. Although the "underlying matter" in

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

261 Ga. App. at 401, 582 S.E.2d at 555.
275 Ga. 255, 564 S.E.2d 715 (2002).
Id. at 255-56, 564 S.E.2d at 716-17.
Id. at 256, 564 S.E.2d at 716-17.
Id., 564 S.E.2d at 717; see Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 448 S.E.2d 192 (1994).
275 Ga. at 256, 564 S.E.2d at 717.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (1995).
275 Ga. at 256, 564 S.E.2d at 717.
Id. at 257, 564 S.E.2d at 717 (quoting Rebich, 264 Ga. at 469, 448 S.E.2d at 194).
273 Ga. 503, 543 S.E.2d 29 (2001).
Ferguson, 275 Ga. at 257-58, 564 S.E.2d at 718.
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Sprayberry was the zoning decision, the property owners did not try to
avoid the administrative process or a discretionary appeal because they
were not parties to the administrative case in which the variance was
issued."6 This distinction may have warranted a different result.
VI.

RECENT LEGISLATION

The general assembly was extremely busy during the survey period
with another regular session of record length. In spite of severe budget
constraints, there continued to be a high level of activity for changes in
agencies, perhaps owing to the presence of a new governor. Among the
highlights were the following:
1. The Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act'65 will now be
enforced by the commissioner
of motor vehicle safety instead of the state
66
revenue commissioner;
2. The Geo. L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Authority
Overview Committee
received changes to its composition and appoint67
ments of members;
3. The Oconee River Greenway Authority revised membership and
purposes, along with a new power to organize a subsidiary nonprofit
corporation;'8
4. Because of new provisions for criminal defense of indigent persons
in the Georgia Indigent Defense Act, 69 the old Georgia Indigent
Defense Council was abolished, and a new Georgia Public Defender
Standards Council was created;...
5. The governing bodies for the Georgia Student Finance Commission,
the Georgia Student Finance Authority, and the Georgia Student
Finance Corporation were revised;' 7'
6. The Georgia Fire Fighter Standards and Training Council
received
72
revised composition, appointment provisions, and terms;
7. The War on Terrorism Local Assistance Act 1 73 created entities for
each county and city in Georgia to be known as a public safety and

164. Id. at 258, 564 S.E.2d at 718.
165. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-620 to -670 (2002).
166. 2003 Ga. Laws 445, 447-48, § 2 (amending O.C.G.A §§ 10-1-665 to -68 (2000)).
167. Id. at 386-87, § 1 (amending O.C.G.A. § 10-9-20 (2000)).
168. Id. at 448-50, §§ 1-5 (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 12-3-401 to -404 (2001)).
169. Id. at 191-217, § 1 (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 17-12-1 to -128 (2002).
170. Id. at 191-222, §§ 1-9 (amending various titles of the O.C.G.A.).
171. Id. at 158-69, §§ 1-8 (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-234, -264, -265, -312, -314, -315,
-344, and -374 (2001)).
172. Id. at 888, 891-94, §§ 5-7 (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 25-4-3, -7 (2003) and enacting
new O.C.G.A. § 25-4-7.1 (2003)).
173. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-75-1 to -10 (Supp. 2003).
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judicial
facilities authority, to be activated by ordinance or resolu174
tion;
8. The Georgia Athlete Agent Regulatory Commission and the Georgia
17 5
Athletic and Entertainment Commission received lengthy revisions;
and
9. The Advisory Board on Anatomical Gift Procurement now must
have an organ recipient as a board member.'76
Four specific enactments will directly affect agency conduct, rules, and
operations:
1. Rules of the Department of Human Resources will by statute
177
supersede those of a county board of health in the event of conflict;
2. The Open Meetings Law 7 1 will not apply to the discussion of
otherwise public records that are exempt from inspection;' 79
3. Related to the above, the Open Records Act 8 ° will exempt from
public inspection any record for which disclosure could compromise
security against sabotage or terrorism;' 8 ' and
4. The Open Records Act now exempts public records which would
identify a person calling the 911 system, unless the request2 is made in
a criminal proceeding and only then for certain purposes.1

174.
(2003)).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

2003 Ga. Laws 862-71, § 1 (enacting new Chapter 75 in Title 36 of the O.C.G.A.
Id. at 774-93, §§ 1-32 (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 43-4A, -4B (2002)).
Id. at 567-68, § 1 (amending O.C.G.A. § 44-5-149 (1991)).
Id. at 569, § 1 (amending O.C.G.A. § 31-2-4 (2001)).
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (2002).
2003 Ga. Laws 880, § 1 (amending O.C.G.A. § 50-14-3 (2002)).
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -77 (2002).
2003 Ga. Laws 880-81, § 2 (amending O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (2002)).
Id. at 602-03, § 1 (amending O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (2002)).

